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At a glance  
The requirement that EEA nationals1 and their family members should be economically active or self-
sufficient and not be a burden on the UK's social assistance system is a significant barrier to the 
acquisition and retention of residence rights. It also impacts on their ability to access a range of UK 
social benefits. The article considers this, and recent developments in relation to principles of 
proportionality and discrimination affecting decision-making processes and the scope for contesting 
decisions. In doing this it comments on the developing judicial discourse around ‘economic 
integration’, particularly after leading cases like Kaczmarek, Lekpo-Bozua and the Supreme Court's 
judgment in Patmalniece.  
Introduction  
Citizens of the European Union enjoy the Treaty-based ‘right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States’. However, this is subject to the ‘conditions and limits’ defined by the 
Treaties and the measures adopted thereunder and which have been adopted to give them effect.2 
Arguably the most potent limitation affecting EEA nationals' residence in another Member State 
comes when they need to access support from that host State's social assistance systems. The 
general expectation is that claimants should either be in employment or self-employment, or else 
have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on those systems. The requirement is integral 
to the scheme in Directive 2004/38 and affects many aspects of the three stages of ‘residence’ 
provided for by the Directive and the UK implementing legislation, the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (the ‘2006 Regulations’):3 281  residence for up to three months 
(the ‘initial period’) (art 6), residence for more than three months (the ‘extended period’)(art 7), and 
permanent residence (arts 16-18).4  
Resources and ‘becoming a burden’  
The initial period is unproblematic unless the EEA national or family member becomes an 
unreasonable burden on the host State's social assistance system (art 14). In this event, the 2006 
Regulations state more explicitly that they will cease to have the right to reside under the 
regulations.5 During the extended period, a right of residence is secure as long as the person is a 
‘worker’ or a ‘self-employed person’ - two of the categories of ‘qualified person’ in the 2006 
Regulations.6 ‘Worker’ status can be acquired and maintained even if the hours are limited and 
wages received are at or below the host State's minimum subsistence wage,7 or if in-work support to 
supplement low wages is claimed.8 All the other groups, ie the ‘self-sufficient’, enrolees at privately 
or publicly funded establishments accredited or financed by the State, and family members of EEA 
nationals, are subject to requirements requiring them to have comprehensive sickness cover and 
‘sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system’. The right of residence 
only continues while the conditions in art 7 are met (art 14). Member States may verify if the 
conditions are being fulfilled, but this may not be carried out ‘systematically’ (art 14(2)). 
Permanent residence, the third key residence right in the typology, is dealt with in Chapter IV and 
the key provisions in arts 16-18 (implemented by reg 15 in the UK). The policy that informed 
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acquisition of the new right of permanent residence based on five years residence appeared to be 
largely directed at applicants satisfying social integration criteria.9 Nevertheless, expectations of 
‘economic integration’ in cases like McCarthy and Lekpo-Bozua seem to have come to the fore.10 In 
the area of retention of residence rights by family members, and their acquisition of permanent 
residence, for example in the event of death or departure from the host State of the EEA national, or 
in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnerships, 
requirements that applicants must have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the 
social assistance system are more explicit.11 In other contexts such as applications for housing 
assistance, it has been held by the Court of Appeal that EEA nationals who are not economically 
active or self-sufficient have not ‘resided 282  legally’ for the purpose of acquiring permanent 
residence, even after nine years residence. They cannot rely on the Treaty for a right of residence 
and remain ‘subject to immigration control’ unless they acquire ‘qualified person’ status under the 
2006 Regulations.12 . 
The UK's system of social benefits mapped on to ‘qualified person’ status when the 2006 Regulations 
implemented Directive 2004/38. The Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Amendment Regulations 
200613 amended key benefits regulations so that a ‘person from abroad’, ie someone who is not 
habitually resident in the UK, Channel Islands, Isle of Man, or Republic of Ireland was ineligible for 
support. In order to be habitually resident a person must generally have a ‘right to reside’. By 
explicitly providing that a person with ‘qualified person’ status is taken out of the restriction, the 
regulations provide that an EEA national in the UK who does not have, or ceases to have, ‘worker’ 
status (and does not qualify for that status under any other category) is removed from eligibility for 
State support.14  
The ‘qualified person’ gateway  
An example of the ‘model’ for the way that ‘person from abroad’ status works, and has been 
mapping on to ‘qualified person’ status since 2006, is provided by reg 21AA of the Income Support 
(General) Regulations 1987.15 The regulations put ‘worker’ at the top of the list of groups taken out 
of ‘person from abroad’ status. This perhaps underlines successive governments' expectations that 
EEA nationals should be working or otherwise reciprocating for any support they receive and 
thereby ‘contributing’ to the UK economy. It also reflects policies aimed at combatting the so-called 
‘pull factor’, despite long-standing doubts about whether there is such a factor - or, if there is, the 
role it plays.16 The financial saving in restricting access to non-contributory benefits funded from 
taxation is also an important policy driver, and this has parallels with the Coalition government's 
recent proposals to limit access to support for non-EU entrants seeking settlement as part of the 
non-EU family migration route.17  
Claimants can, of course, look to EU sources for a right of residence, including secondary legislation 
like Regulation 1612/68 art 12, assisting groups like primary carers of children who have started in 
the UK education system after one of their parents had worker status.18 Direct reliance on the Treaty 
itself can also assist, as in the Baumbast case,19 and when it is necessary and  283  appropriate to fill 
a perceived lacuna in the residence scheme in order to assist groups like carers who have had no 
alternative but to resign from their employment in order to look after sick family members (an issue 
revisited later in this article). 
In such cases proportionality and discrimination requirements have featured in the operation of the 




The ‘residence’ gateway: proportionality and discrimination  
Although resort to benefits like Income Support or Pension Credit (a similar benefit, but paid to older 
claimants) raises the question of whether the claimant has become, or is at risk of becoming an 
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system, it is implicit that there should be an effective 
process evaluating this, and one that adequately addresses factors like the scale, extent, and likely 
duration of support.20 Aspects of UK practice appear to be suspect in this respect, particularly as it is 
far from clear that UK agencies' decision-makers deploy, or deploy consistently, any kind of 
structured approach that enables all the three criteria that the directive and the guidance expect 
should be properly addressed. Furthermore, there are a number of scenarios in which claimants can 
be treated as either having had no right of residence, or as losing one as a result of seeking 
support.21 Similar eligibility issues can arise in relation to support for working claimants, for example 
through tax credits, when eligibility is adjudicated, checked or reviewed.22  
In the face of such approaches by adjudicating agencies, the scope for contesting them (and invoking 
proportionality, discrimination and Convention rights) are important, and this is now considered. 
The courts and the ‘right to reside’  
The UK courts have generally been supportive of the right to reside scheme, including the way 
‘qualified person’ and person from abroad’ status is used. In the leading case of Abdirahman 23 the 
court made it clear that without ‘qualified person’ status, most claimants are effectively barred out 
of even the most basic support. In dismissing the appeals of two claimants who were not in 
employment and who did not otherwise qualify for qualified person status, the court said it was not 
enough for them to be lawfully present. They also had to be ‘resident’ on the basis expected by the 
right to reside scheme.24 Although the court accepted that the scheme did not impact on claimants' 
ability to acquire a right of residence directly from the Treaty, this was held not to be an option for 
economically inactive residents given the limitation in Directive 90/364 (now in Directive 2004/38) 
that beneficiaries of free movement should not be an unreasonable burden on the public finances of 
the host State - a condition they considered to be 284  proportionate to the legitimate aim of 
protecting the host State's public finances, and reinforced by observations made in Trojani. 25  
The Court of Appeal accepted that the discrimination provisions of the Treaty were engaged when 
an EU national is refused support for reasons that are not applied to host State nationals26 - but said 
this only assisted those with a right of residence under the Treaty or national law, or where the 
authorities had approved the residence (as in Trojani ). If schemes were indirectly discriminatory (as 
had been conceded by the Secretary of State earlier in the appeal), the court considered there was 
sufficient evidence to establish ‘justification’ on the basis of the government's response in 2004 to 
the Social Security Advisory Committee's report.27 Lloyd LJ went further and also derived support 
from judicial pronouncements on ‘benefit tourism’ and irregular status. He quoted comments of 
Sedley LJ in R (Morris) v Westminster City Council (No 3): 28 ‘The problem is in all significant respects 
a problem of foreign nationals either coming to this country (benefit tourism) or outstaying their 
leave to be here (irregular status) in order to take advantage of the priority housing status accorded 
to homeless families. Measures directed at this, I accept, require no explicit justification, whether 
because they are an aspect of immigration control or because they are an obviously legitimate 
response to a manifest problem.’ 
Retention issues: Baumbast, lacuna-filling and proportionality  
In practice, many of the contentious aspects of the subject focus on problems of retention of 
residence rights. Both the directive and 2006 Regulations enable ‘worker’ status to be kept after 
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involuntary loss of employment. Jobseekers must maintain jobseeking conditions. However, the 
scheme is restrictive, and makes it difficult for some groups like carers and single parents with 
particularly demanding childcare needs.29 Judges have been reluctant to entertain arguments that 
the retention scheme is discriminatory and incompatible with the Sex Discrimination Act 1995, for 
example because of its impact on women with childcare responsibilities.30 Other judgments have 
been more supportive when it has been possible to fill a perceived lacuna in the retention system 
with the help of proportionality principles. In one such ‘carer’ case,31 the claimant was a 
Cameroonian national who, while an asylum claimant, married a French national working in the UK. 
Her ‘worker’ status meant she had a right to reside. This, in turn, meant that he had a right of 
residence as her family member. However, 285 after he became seriously ill she gave up her 
employment to care for him. The level of care she provided meant she had to give up her 
employment, and having no other resources her husband had no choice but to look to the benefits 
system. Decision-makers immediately decided that both of the couple had lost their right to reside. 
Judge Rowland concluded that a right of residence could be asserted in these circumstances, and 
lack of ‘self-sufficiency’ should not be ‘determinative in every case’ (paras 36, 37). 
Later cases, however, have been more circumspect in allowing appellants to take the Baumbast 
route, as seen in the Court of Appeal decision in Kaczmarek, 32 a case in which Maurice Kay described 
the issues as ‘labyrinthine’. 
Kaczmarek: into the labyrinth…  
In Kaczmarek, the claimant was a Polish national who started her residence in the UK as a student in 
April 2002. She started working in a nursing home in June 2003, but then stopped working in July 
2004, and took a period of maternity leave from August 2004, intending to return to employment 
after that. This was put off, however, as her child was unwell and needed care from her. She was, in 
any case, unable to afford childcare, making it difficult for her to remain in employment - a barrier 
that is currently set to affect a lot more workers in the UK.33 In the event she did not resume 
employment until October 2006. In the meantime she claimed Income Support. Her claim was 
rejected on the basis that, by the time she claimed, she no longer had a right of residence.34 
Although she had only intended to be out of the labour market for a short while, it was long enough 
for decision-makers to treat her right of residence as at an end. 
On appeal, she contended that the decisions refusing her support were disproportionate, and that in 
any case a right of residence could be founded directly on arts 12 and 18 EC of the Treaty - 
particularly, as she argued, she could show ‘a level of social integration and settlement’ that the 
European Court envisaged in Trojani. 35 Her appeal failed. Although the court in Trojani had indicated 
that lawful residence ‘for a certain time’ could assist, Maurice Kay LJ (at para 16) took this to refer to 
qualifying periods giving rise to an express right of residence. By the phrase's juxtaposition with ‘or 
possesses a residence permit’, he considered that it was being advanced as ‘one of two ways in 
which an economically inactive migrant may rely on art.12 as a result of specific and substantive 
entitlement’. In any case he thought it undesirable to use art 12 as a way of producing ‘an open-
textured temporal qualification’, and considered that eligibility should be ‘a matter for normative 
regulation rather than discretion or subjective evaluation on a case-by-case basis’. He rejected 
proportionality as a basis for allowing the appeal, distinguishing Baumbast as that case involved a 
working claimant who was largely self-sufficient. Approving the reasoning of Judge Rowland, he 
thought that to permit residence to be based on art 18 when EU legislation had excluded a particular 
class of persons from eligibility would be to ‘attack the Directive’. Although art 18 could be relied on 
to supplement the Directive, before a national court or tribunal the limitations in a directive could 
not be removed (paras 20-22). In a novel approach, he also considered that if a claimant gained an 
286 unconditional right to support by acquiring permanent residence, it was difficult to argue that it 
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was disproportionate to exclude someone who had become economically inactive after three years 
residence. 
Proportionality principles also featured in the House of Lords case of Zalewska.36 In that case, 
Baroness Hale and Lord Neuberger dissented from the majority's decision and considered that to 
deprive a worker of benefits after she had been employed in the UK for twelve months (just because 
four months of this period had not been in WRS-registered employment) was disproportionate - 
particularly as the main aim of the WRS was primarily just to monitor the numbers of A8 nationals in 
work, and the sectors they worked in. 
Given the difficulties that claimants have experienced in this area of the social benefits system, and 
uncertainty about how decision-makers and courts in the UK approaches should map on to EU 
requirements, it was helpful when in 2009 the EU Commission provided guidance. 
Economic inactivity, resources and proportionality ‘tests’  
In 2008 an EU Commission report37 described the transposition of Directive 2004/38 as 
‘disappointing’. On aspects relating to social assistance, it noted that a common problem was the 
failure to take decisions ‘on the basis of personal circumstances’ (para 3.4.2). Guidance on the 
implementation of the legislation then followed in 2009. It included points about the way 
restrictions on access to social assistance should operate, including proportionality aspects.38  
The centrepiece of the Commission's guidance focuses on the suggestion that States should use a 
‘proportionality test’ to assess what the Commission clearly sees as the key issue, which is whether a 
person whose resources are no longer ‘sufficient’ and who has been granted subsistence support ‘is 
or has become an unreasonable burden…’ The source of the claimant's resources is generally 
irrelevant as long as it is available.39 It then reminds Member States' authorities of what is said in 
Directive 2004/38, recital 16, ie that ‘The host Member State should examine whether it is a case of 
temporary difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, the personal circumstances 
and the amount of aid granted in order to consider whether the beneficiary has become an 
unreasonable burden on its social assistance system…’ 
The guidance adds a number of specific points (Section 2.3.1), as follows: 
(1) Duration  
 For how long is the benefit being granted? 
 Outlook: is it likely that the EU citizen will get out of the safety net soon? 
 How long has the residence lasted in the host Member State? 
(2) Personal Situation  
 What is the level of connection of the EU and his/her family members with the society of the 
host Member State? 
 Are there any considerations pertaining to age, state of health, family and economic 
situation that need to be taken into account? 
(3) Amount  
 Total amount of aid granted? 
 Does the EU citizen have a history of relying heavily on social assistance? 
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 Does the EU citizen have a history of contributing to the financing of social assistance in the 
host Member State? 
Finally, the guidance makes it clear that only actual receipt of social assistance benefits is relevant 
when determining if a person is a burden on the system. 
Clearly such guidance does not have legislative effect. Nevertheless, it must be regarded as a form of 
quasi-legislation that at one level is ‘soft’ law but which, in practice, has a significantly more formal 
status as it supplements and reinforces existing legislation.40 It is an authoritative source, given the 
Commission's role in ensuring that the proper functioning and development of the Union, and 
shaping the way it expects Member States' obligations to be fulfilled. Commission measures against 
a State it considers has failed to fulfil an obligation include the use of a ‘reasoned opinion’ following 
an opportunity for the State to submit its observations (TFEU, art 226).41 A comparison between 
what EU law envisages and UK practice suggests that there may well be a significant deficit in terms 
of compliance. 
In the remainder of this article consideration is given to discrimination aspects of the UK's 
‘residence’ regime, and its impact on take-up of social benefits. 
The right to reside: discriminatory?  
The scope for invoking legislation and principles relating to direct or indirect discrimination has been 
clear for some while, and certainly since the introduction of the habitual residence test in the 1990s 
and cases like Collins. 42 However, the precise scope of anti-discrimination measures, for example 
those in art 3 of Regulation 1408/71, has been less clear. A key question is whether the 
discrimination that obviously permeates most UK social assistance schemes should be classed as 
‘direct’ or ‘indirect’. If the latter, then it is capable of ‘justification’. 
288  Given the uncertainty around this, particularly in the aftermath of the European Court's 
controversial judgment in Bressol, 43 it was helpful when the issues came before the Supreme Court 
earlier this year in Patmalniece. 44  
Patmalniece: economic integration and discrimination  
The appellant in Patmalniece was Latvian, but of Russian origin. Galina Patmalniece had been in paid 
employment for over forty years in Latvia before moving to the UK in 2000. Fearing persecution 
because of her Russian origin she sought asylum in the UK. This failed, and receiving no support from 
the UK welfare system she only had her Latvian pension, worth about £50 a month, to live on. 
Following Latvia's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 she claimed State Pension Credit, 
a means-tested source of income provided under the State Pension Credit Act 2002 and the State 
Pension Credit Regulations.45 It provides eligible pensioners with support if they do not have 
retirement income, or need an income ‘top up’ to raise their income. Her claim was refused as she 
could not satisfy the scheme's ‘presence’ requirements. These impose a residence gateway that 
focuses on claimants' ability to demonstrate a right to reside and habitual residence. More precisely, 
reg 2(1) states that ‘A person is to be treated as not in Great Britain if …he is not habitually resident 
in the United Kingdom…’; and in regulation 2(2) ‘No person shall be treated as habitually resident … 
unless he has a right to reside in (as the case may be) the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the 
Isle of Man or the Republic of Ireland…’ As with the Income Support scheme discussed, the scheme 
(in somewhat tortuous fashion) goes on to say in reg (4) that ‘A person is not to be treated as not in 
Great Britain if he is - (a) a worker … (b) a self-employed person…’ and is otherwise within the scope 
of the directive. The problem was that the claimant had not been in paid employment, and so had 
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not held ‘worker’ status since her arrival in the UK. Nor did she come within any of the other 
‘qualified person’ categories. 
On the face of it the refusal was plainly discriminatory given that art 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) 
1408/71, which like the legislation that has replaced it from 1 May 2011 as far as EEA nationals are 
concerned,46 clearly accords EEA nationals the right to equal treatment with UK nationals. The 
President of Appeal Tribunals at the first-tier of the appeals system was very clear that this was not 
only discrimination, but direct discrimination given the difficulties faced by EEA claimants in 
comparison to UK nationals' requirements. On appeal, however, this was overturned.47 The judge 
accepted that the imposition of the right to reside test, which all UK nationals, but only some EU 
nationals passed, was discriminatory - but it was indirect discrimination. He accepted that the right 
to reside was a necessary and proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (the protection of 
the State's public finances). 
A further appeal to the Court of Appeal failed.48 After stressing the importance of integration 
requirements, Moses LJ observed that ‘Absent that degree of economic or social integration which 
both EU and domestic legislation recognise as a justifiable condition for 289 entitlement, there is no 
unlawful discrimination in refusing her a benefit which has the characteristics of social assistance.’ 
The Supreme Court's approach  
In the leading judgment, Lord Hope (at para 20) identified three main issues: 
1. Did the conditions of entitlement to support (as set out in reg 2 of the 2002 Regulations) give rise 
to direct (‘overt’) discrimination for the purposes of art 3 of Reg 1408/71 - or was any discrimination 
involved indirect ? 
2. If any discrimination was indirect, could that discrimination be objectively justified on grounds 
independent of the appellant's nationality? 
3. Assuming the indirect discrimination could be objectively justified, was that outcome undermined 
by the favourable treatment given by reg 2(2) to Irish nationals? 
He accepted that the disadvantage that nationals of other Member States encountered when trying 
to meet the requirements of reg 2(2) are ‘due entirely to their nationality’ and had a right to reside 
been the sole condition of entitlement ‘it would without doubt have been directly discriminatory on 
grounds of nationality’ (para 29). However, he thought that the effect of reg 2(2) had to be looked at 
in the context of the scheme in s1(2)(a) of the State Pension Credit Act 2002 and reg 2 ‘as a whole’. 
He also noted that while most UK nationals were habitually resident, others were not. Furthermore, 
although they could all meet the right to reside requirement in reg 2(2) because of their nationality, 
it was not nationality alone that enabled them to meet the requirement in reg 2(1).49 He went on to 
observe that in cases involving ‘composite’ tests like this, the reasoning in Bressol 50 assisted. In that 
case, changes in French education policy had meant that more students from France had started to 
come to Belgium. Belgium thereupon introduced a range of further conditions on access, conditions 
that that did not extend to Belgian nationals. The court in that case, however, took this to be indirect 
discrimination, rejecting Advocate General Sharpston's conclusion that it was direct.  
Lord Hope described the Advocate General's work as a ‘powerful opinion’. He noted that she had 
said that discrimination could be considered to be direct where the difference in treatment was 
based on a criterion which was either explicitly that of nationality or was necessarily linked to a 
characteristic ‘indissociable’ from nationality (para 53). She had then examined each of the 
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cumulative conditions separately. She considered that the first cumulative condition - that the 
principal place of residence was in Belgium - did not constitute direct discrimination because 
Belgians and non-Belgians alike could establish their principal place of residence in Belgium. As this, 
apparently neutral, condition was likely to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other 
Member States, it was indirectly discriminatory (paras 60-62). However, in contrast, the second 
cumulative condition was necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from nationality. 
Belgians automatically had the right to remain permanently in Belgium. They therefore satisfied the 
second cumulative condition 290 automatically. Non-Belgians, on the other hand, had to fulfil 
additional criteria to acquire a right permanently to remain in Belgium or to satisfy one of the seven 
other conditions. This discrimination, she concluded, was based on nationality and was therefore 
direct discrimination. The measures were therefore precluded by the articles of the Treaty. 
The problem, though, as Lord Hope noted, was that the court had not adopted the Advocate 
General's approach, adding that the contrast between her ‘carefully reasoned approach’ and that of 
the court was ‘so profound that it could not have been overlooked’.51 The court had examined the 
conditions in a way that clearly indicated the court had seen the case as one of indirect 
discrimination. 
He observed the ‘obvious similarity’ between the issues in that case, and the case before the 
Supreme Court, commenting that the State Pension Credit scheme, and the residence and presence 
tests it included, were undoubtedly designed to make them more capable of being satisfied by a UK 
national than by other Member States' nationals. However, applying Bressol, the scheme was only 
indirectly discriminatory. Nevertheless, as the scheme put EEA nationals at a particular disadvantage 
it still had to be justified (para 35). In Bidar52 the ECJ had held that the criteria for granting assistance 
to cover the maintenance of students risked placing nationals of other Member States at a 
disadvantage, particularly as the condition requiring them to have residence in the United Kingdom 
prior to their studies was likely to be more easily satisfied by UK nationals. This could be justified 
only if it was based on ‘objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons 
concerned and was proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions’. Applying this to 
the Patmalniece case, the focus was on the reasons of the Secretary of State for the difference in 
treatment in the Pension Credit scheme. Did they provide an objective justification for it? Even if 
they did, said Lord Hope, was the justification based on considerations that were ‘independent of 
the nationality of those concerned’? 
After examining this further, Lord Hope accepted that the wish of the Secretary of State to prevent 
exploitation of welfare benefits by those living but not working in the UK was a ‘legitimate reason’. 
He thought this was supported by Advocate General Geelhoed's opinion in Trojani (at para 70) that it 
is a basic principle of EU law that persons who depend on social assistance ‘will be taken care of in 
their own Member State’. After assessing the question of whether the justification offered was 
‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ in the Pension Credit context, and whether it operated in a way that was 
‘independent of the nationality of those concerned’, he accepted the case made by the Secretary of 
State. 
Baroness Hale  
The main issue for Baroness Hale was whether it was legitimate to limit access by an EEA claimant 
like the appellant to benefits, entitlement to which depended on a residence right in the host State. 
She pointed out (at para 103) that: ‘In answering that question, it is logical to look at the European 
law on the right to reside. If nationals of one Member State have the right to move to reside in 
another Member State under European Union law, it is logical to require that they also have the 
right to claim special non-contributory cash benefits there - in other words that the State in which 
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they reside should be responsible for ensuring that they have the minimum means of subsistence to 
enable them to live there. But if they do not have the right 291 under European Union law to move 
to reside there, then it is logical that that State should not have the responsibility for ensuring their 
minimum level of subsistence.’53  
She accepted, as the Grand Chamber had done in Trojani, that a claimant seeking a benefit because 
of lack of resources could not derive a right to reside from art 18 of the Treaty as that ‘lack of 
resources’ took him outside the terms of Directive 90/364. In the event, the court in Trojani, having 
held that a person such as Mr Trojani did not derive a right to reside from European Union law, went 
on to say that a citizen of the Union who had been lawfully resident in the host Member State for a 
certain time or possessed a residence permit, and satisfied the conditions required of nationals of 
that Member State, could not be denied benefits.54 He was entitled, during his lawful residence to 
benefit from the equal treatment principle in art 12. She took that to mean that, even if a claimant 
does not have a right of residence under European Union law, if he had the right to reside under the 
national law of the host country, he was also entitled to claim benefits on the same terms as 
nationals of the host country. She did not find anything in Trojani, though, to suggest that ‘mere 
presence, without any right to reside in the host country, was sufficient’. All the emphasis, she said, 
in the relevant paragraphs 40 to 45 was on residence and not presence - and moreover on what she 
termed ‘formally approved residence’. 
The only dissenting voice in the Supreme Court was Lord Walker's. Despite accepting that the case 
had to be seen as one of indirect discrimination, he still saw the restrictions in the scheme as based, 
essentially, on nationality. In this respect, and in common with the President of Appeal Tribunals 
when he allowed the appeal in the First-tier Tribunal, he identified the provisions in reg 2(2) of the 
State Pension Credit Regulations 2002 as ‘probably aimed at discriminating against economically 
inactive foreign nationals on the grounds of nationality, noting that whether or not that was 
intended by those framing the legislation, ‘they have that effect’. He did not think the discrimination 
was capable of justification because once it was examined it was ‘founded on nationality’ (para 79). 
The EU Commission's ‘notice’  
In his arguments on behalf of the AIRE Centre (as interveners in the appeal) Richard Drabble QC 
referred the court to the ‘notice’ of the EU Commission to the UK in which it invited the UK to 
submit observations on the compatibility with EU Law of the imposition of the right to reside test for 
benefits within the scope of Regulation 1408/71.55 The notice, issued last year, expressed the 
Commission's concerns about the way the right to reside system has been operating, and requested 
the UK to ‘end discriminatory conditions on the right to reside as a worker which exclude from 
certain social benefits nationals from the A8 Accession States’. It was implicit in the notice that the 
requirements were seen by the Commission as ‘discriminatory’, a breach of transitional 
arrangements on free movement, and of the obligation to ‘ensure equal treatment on the basis of 
nationality’. Although Lord Hope addressed the point 292 in his judgment, he concluded that it was 
still ‘too early’ to draw any conclusions on this aspect of the case (para 40). The Commission are 
right to be concerned about the operation of the right to reside, particularly given the scale of its 
impact on A8 nationals' trying to access social benefits.56 Like other EEA nationals, the right to reside 
continues to bar A8 nationals out of social benefits if they are economically inactive. Furthermore, 
the Border Agency also regards them as liable to removal, an issue recently highlighted when a 
Czech national was reported to the agency for begging. Assisted by the AIRE Centre, she won an 
appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) after claiming Jobseeker's 
Allowance. Various other grounds of appeal were relied on, including the possibility that she was 





Clearly, the system by which EEA nationals and their family members acquire and retain residence 
rights is problematic in key respects. UK practice, in the way claims and awards of social assistance 
are currently being decided, is likely to be out of kilter with what EU law expects, particularly in the 
way proportionality principles should inform decisions on ‘residence’ and support. It is also certainly 
the case that some groups, including single parents, carers, and older citizens are more vulnerable to 
current UK approaches to determining if residence rights have been acquired and retained. 
The situation of older EEA nationals like Galina Patmalniece seems to be a particular concern, 
especially in the context of an emerging political and judicial discourse that is starting to equate 
economic inactivity with a ‘failure to integrate’.58 Her exclusion from a right of residence, and 
therefore from State Pension Credit - the most basic support needed to secure dignity in old age 
which is readily available to most UK and Irish claimants, including those who may never have been 
in any kind of paid employment - does not say much about the value of European Union citizenship. 
Nor does it set much of a standard for the quality of life EU nationals can expect when they reside in 
other Member States after spending most of their adult life in employment in another EU State. 
Whilst the decision may be in accordance with the UK's legal regime, the result looks harsh. Galina 
Patmalniece was marginalised and made destitute by no less than two UK residence rights regimes - 
first, as an asylum claimant, and then as a result of the habitual residence system. It is unfortunate 
that this is happening against a backdrop of European initiatives aimed at combating the social 
exclusion of European ‘elders’, and ‘exploring new ways to support active ageing’.59  
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